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Abstract
The battle to soften the labour market impact of the pandemic has thrown up some unlikely
bedfellows, with trade union leaders competing with business chiefs over who can most ful-
somely praise the government’s economic response. But does this entente really presage a
new era of ‘Covid-corporatism’? Crises like Covid-19 can provide opportunities for tempo-
rary social pacts, even in countries lacking the labour market institutions needed to sustain
these in normal times, and the ‘social partners’ have shown an unusual willingness to be
bold and constructive. But cracks are already appearing over how and when the state should
begin its withdrawal from the economy. Unions face structural weaknesses and recruitment
problems that will hamper their ability to take full advantage of what will likely prove to be
only a temporary lull in hostilities.
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FOLLOWING THE 2019 general election, few
would have anticipated a Conservative gov-
ernment stuffed with Brexiteers pursuing
fiscal activism on a gargantuan scale, institut-
ing an economy-wide wage subsidy and
openly contemplating rescuing, and possibly
even nationalising, large swathes of the pri-
vate sector.
Yet, this is what the government is doing,
and both the Confederation of British Indus-
try (CBI) and Trades Union Congress (TUC)
are united in backing it to the hilt. At the
company level, firms and their workers have
been cooperating amidst the pandemic on
adjustments to employment patterns, wage
freezes and arrangements for social distanc-
ing at work. Such an entente between the
state and what used to be known as the ‘so-
cial partners’ has proven as surprising as it
is welcome. The UK economy faces an
unprecedented growth and employment cri-
sis, and both sides—employers and organ-
ised labour—have a part to play in assisting
the government in managing the economic
transition to a socially distanced future.
Of course, the UK is not alone in this.
Such concertation between the main labour
market actors is happening all over Europe
as governments attempt to build consensus
around the draconian actions needed to pro-
tect public health and their economies. In
Belgium, collective labour agreements deal-
ing with suspensions of work contracts have
been agreed and business and unions have
issued joint statements on social distancing.
Danish union and business groups have led
the way in negotiating wage compensation
and job preservation schemes with the gov-
ernment. Germany has revamped its success-
ful financial crisis-era short-time working
scheme in conjunction with unions and
employers.
But the UK case is interesting because it is
so unusual. Although more than 6.5 million
workers are members of trade unions here—
which is a higher proportion (density) of the
workforce than Germany—private sector
unions play little role in either sectoral bar-
gaining or economic and social policy mak-
ing, as German unions do. Conservative
Prime Ministers in particular have generally
regarded unions as an irrelevance at best
(John Major, David Cameron, Theresa May),
or a dangerous enemy at worst (Margaret
Thatcher). Business, for its part, is too
weakly organised to act as a reliable bargain-
ing partner for organised labour, even if it
wanted to, and has anyway tended to be
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regarded by recent Conservative govern-
ments as just one lobby group among many.
For various reasons, UK industrial rela-
tions have tended to be more conflictual
than on the Continent. Strikes may have
declined precipitously since their 1979 peak,
when almost 30 million working days were
lost to industrial action, but this is usually
attributed to the unions’ weakness, rather
than a desire for cooperation.
This makes the newly collaborative atmo-
sphere all the more noteworthy. But will it
last? The pandemic certainly creates a ratio-
nale for some form of social partnership to
help manage the economic and labour mar-
ket impact of the shutdown and its after-
math. It has also exposed shortcomings of
the UK’s economic model that leaves parts
of society exposed to labour market precarity
which has been exacerbated by the disrup-
tion of Covid. Further down the track lie
other, even more intractable, problems, such
as the productivity crisis and the need to
decarbonise large parts of the economy, that
require cooperation, not conflict, to solve
them. All sides—labour, business and the
government—have more to gain than to lose
at the moment from partnering up.
But even where there could be a will,
there is not necessarily a way. This article
examines the current climate for cooperation
between business, labour and the state. It
looks back at previous phases of tripartism
and explores structural fissures in UK indus-
trial relations that brought this down. It con-
cludes with the observation that unions’
weakness means any outbreak of social part-
nership, while welcome, will be very much
on employers’ terms.
The unlikely rise of Covid-
corporatism?
The boldness of the government’s economic
and labour market response to Covid has
drawn fulsome praise and surprisingly warm
words. Frances O’Grady, the TUC’s General
Secretary has praised the Conservative Chan-
cellor, Rishi Sunak, as ‘smart, intelligent and
someone who listens’. CBI Director General,
Carolyn Fairbairn, has talked of labour and
business working in partnership to deal with
the immense challenges of the pandemic.
Fairbairn has repeatedly highlighted the
importance of building ‘consensus’ behind
any restart approach and often references the
CBI’s work with a range of stakeholders,
including the TUC.
The mutual admiration has been accompa-
nied by joint action. Early pressure by
unions and employers forced the govern-
ment to act to switch manufacturing capacity
over to making ventilators. The CBI and
TUC have coordinated messaging on the
economic response and are cooperating over
rules on lifting lockdown. Both assisted the
Treasury on designing and implementing the
Job Retention Scheme and cooperated on
workplace conditions, with the Health and
Safety Executive, CBI and TUC issuing joint
calls on safety and social distancing. Where
cracks have begun to appear in the other-
wise united front, for example, over resis-
tance by teaching and transport unions to
opening up schools and public transport, the
CBI and TUC have gone out of their way
not to fan the flames.
Why now? In one sense, the reason is obvi-
ous. The country is facing economic turmoil
and the interests of businesses, trade unions,
and government are clearly aligned in avoid-
ing depression and mass unemployment. All
want to see companies and jobs preserved, or
at least for time to be bought to get as many
viable businesses as possible through lock-
down. Covid is much more severe than the
financial crisis, when unions and the left were
highly critical of moves to bail out banks
while leaving most of the non-financial econ-
omy to takes it chances. The crisis this time is
a symmetric shock affecting virtually the
entire economy. The startling capacity of the
virus for economic destruction was always
likely to produce a strong policy response.
Nevertheless, the gigantic levels of public
spending and close focus on job and income
preservation have given unions and business
little to complain about so far.
And there is more to come. ‘Project Birch’,
currently under discussion at the Treasury,
could see the government take stakes in ailing
but important businesses. Strings may be
attached to some of these bailouts, for exam-
ple, to force airlines or aircraft manufacturers
to internalise some of the social costs of the
pollution created by their products. Action on
tax avoidance and protection of ‘strategic’
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sectors against hostile takeovers are also on
the horizon (especially if the threat emanates
from China). These are all things the TUC has
championed for years and unions can, pre-
sumably, scarcely believe that they are on the
threshold of being enacted by a Conservative
government. Yet business also heavily backs
the stimulus package. The enthusiasm of the
CBI, often derided by Margaret Thatcher as
even more of a corporatist dinosaur than the
TUC, is predictable. But there has been little
dissent either from the more decentralised Bri-
tish Chambers of Commerce or the more pro-
market Institute for Directors.
More room for social partnership?
Could the terrain for social partnership,
therefore, be shifting in its favour? For trade
unions, which are seeing membership ticking
up again after decades of decline, there is a
lot to play for. The scale of state intervention
in the economy is creating new opportunities
for unions to make themselves useful. The
TUC has called for a tripartite recovery
council to embed consultation of social part-
ners in devising post-Covid reconstruction
measures. While it won’t necessarily get this,
there are signs that the government will
make job preservation and creation a prior-
ity. The need for the Conservatives to retain
‘red wall’ constituencies in the Midlands and
north of England won unexpectedly from
Labour at the last election may herald a
more ‘blue collar’ Conservatism less reflex-
ively hostile to organised labour. Outrage at
growing labour market insecurity was a
major theme of Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour
Party, but many on the traditional Conserva-
tive right also regret the increasing precarity
of the gig economy and the damage it does
to families and communities.1
The ‘productivity crisis’ over the last dec-
ade, which has seen the weakest sustained
period of productivity growth for the last
250 years, has also undermined arguments
from the free-market right that trade unions
and collective bargaining are bad for compe-
tition and efficiency, as stagnating productiv-
ity coincides with a continued weakening of
trade union numbers and power.
If anything, Covid has ruthlessly exposed
the fragility of parts of the public sector and
the ‘barely in time’ business models of many
companies. This chimes with what some
trade unions and the more thoughtful sec-
tions of business have been saying for some
time. There are tentative signs that attitudes
toward social partnership may be changing
among at least some businesses in favour of
a less adversarial climate for labour relations.
Since the financial crisis, an increasingly
prevalent view has taken hold in many parts
of the City and business that the Friedmanite
doctrine of ‘shareholder primacy’ represents
a mutant form of capitalism that is responsi-
ble for excessive corporate short-termism,
manifested in high executive pay, low invest-
ment, and disregard for communities and
the environment.2
Work done by the Big Innovation Centre
and Professor Colin Mayer’s British Acad-
emy project on the ‘future of the corporation’
has suggested rewiring capitalism in order
to widen the range of incentives facing com-
pany managers beyond the narrowly finan-
cial obligation of increasing returns to
shareholdings.3 Instead of advancing the pri-
vate interests of owners, company bosses
would be obliged to reconceptualise their
firms around societal goals and incorporate
the interests of suppliers, customers and
employees in their strategies by adopting a
clear ‘purpose’ for their business. The ‘pur-
poseful company’ was all the rage at Davos
earlier this year, and many businesses have
trumpeted their purpose agendas during
Covid.
Pressure on companies to look after their
staff better and do good may also come from
their owners. Mutual and pension funds
now build detailed environmental, social,
and governance (ESG) assessments into their
decision making and expect the companies
they invest in to explain how they will meet
those goals. ESG-focussed investment funds
now account for around a fifth of the invest-
ment market and investors in them can
expect financial performance that is on a par
with, or better, than other funds.
The shock of Covid could, in theory, build
impetus behind a more long-term, patient
style of capitalism placing less emphasis on
delivering shareholder value and more on
advancing the interests of stakeholders such
as workers and the wider community. While
many on the left would like to take this a lot
further, with shared ownership and workers
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on company boards, it could nevertheless
signal a less adversarial style of industrial
relations from companies which provides
new niches for trade unions.
Meanwhile, at the macropolitical level, a
government cleaving to an earthier, more
‘blue-collar’ style of Conservatism and wres-
tling with the labour market challenges pre-
sented by a socially distanced workplace,
could find a rationale for involving unions
more in policy making than in the past, for
example, in helping to administer the ‘ap-
prenticeships for all young people’ pledge
made recently by Boris Johnson. The TUC
has often proven to be an effective interlocu-
tor for employers as well as governments of
either party. It has regularly argued for
unfashionable policies that later become
mainstream, such as industrial policy and a
national minimum wage. The TUC and CBI
often see eye to eye on the major economic
issues and both came together during the
financial crisis to urge the government to
intervene more in the non-financial economy.
The Brexit referendum and its messy after-
math saw an unprecedented alliance of
worker and employer groups campaigning
against leaving the EU.
Neocorporatism in postwar
economies
How far might all this go? In answering this
question, it’s useful to be reminded of earlier
periods of cooperation between unions, busi-
ness, and the state, and how this panned out.
Political economists developed the term
‘neocorporatism’ in the 1970s to describe
institutionalised labour market coordination
and policy concertation. The goals of neo-
corporatism have generally included macroe-
conomic demand management through
negotiated wage restraint, as well as more
generalised cooperation over labour market
and welfare issues.
Lucio Baccaro distinguishes between clas-
sic neocorporatism as a particular structure
of interest representation on one hand, and
‘concertation’ or ‘social partnership’ as a par-
ticular policy-making process on the other.
The former, theorised by Philippe Schmitter,
focusses on the organisational characteristics
of the interest representation system and is
possibly more exacting, in that it requires
monopolistic, centralised and internally non-
democratic social partners.4 The latter, asso-
ciated with the work of Gerhard Lehmbruch,
is an institutionalised but altogether looser
pattern of negotiated policy formation in
which large interest organisations cooperate
with each other and the state over a range of
policy objectives.5
Arguably, though, the UK better exempli-
fies a third type. This is Hugh Compston’s
concept of ‘political trade unionism’ in which
trade unions participate, along with busi-
ness, directly in macroeconomic policy mak-
ing. Indeed, on this measure, the UK was
briefly the most neocorporatist country in
Europe during the mid-1970s.6 This was dur-
ing the time of statutory incomes policies
under the ‘Social Contract’, when both
Labour and Conservative governments enter-
tained business and trade union leaders in
Number Ten for beer and sandwiches in a
doomed attempt to manage the economy
centrally and control inflation through nego-
tiated wage restraint.
However, this phase was basically restricted
to a period between 1962—when the National
Economic Development Council (NEDC) was
set up by Conservative PrimeMinister, Harold
MacMillan, to provide a forum to coordinate
economic planning—and 1979 when the Social
Contract was abandoned by the incoming
Thatcher government, although the NEDC
somehow limped on until 1992. Arguably, the
Social Contract had fallen apart long before
Labour was ejected from power in 1979—retail
price inflation had, after all, averaged 14 per
cent between 1972 and 1978 despite the sup-
posedly rigid incomes policy—and Thatcher
made short work of what remained.
Why was the UK experience so unsuccess-
ful? Returning to Schmitter’s definition, neo-
corporatism requires a relatively rare set of
conditions which the UK appears simply not
to possess. These include: a cooperative and
cohesive labour movement; the presence of
state institutions for tripartite management;
the institutionalisation of working class
power within unions; unions that are suffi-
ciently centralised to ensure discipline; and
adequate elite influence to ensure rank and
file compliance with agreed polices.7 In the
absence of these features, while UK unions
were capable of reaching neocorporatist
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deals with government they lacked the inter-
nal discipline to make them stick.
The UK’s problem, according to Colin
Crouch, lies in its industrial relations struc-
ture of competitive, craft-based unions reluc-
tant to cooperate even with each other,
let alone business or the state. To the New
Right, this self-evidently chaotic structure
was highly inflationary and undermined
industrial peace. Thatcher therefore made it
one of her main goals—achieved through
five anti-trade union Acts of Parliament—to
decollectivise wage bargaining and remove
unions as veto players over economic
reform.8
Additionally, the structure of UK capital-
ism arguably offers few institutional niches
for unions and produces a generally hostile
environment for neocorporatism and social
partnership. In a ‘liberal market economy’
(LME) such as the UK, strong trade unions
are an encumbrance, as they bid up wages
and inhibit rapid company restructuring
without offering any of the cooperative bene-
fits accruing to their counterparts in the
coordinated market economies (CMEs) of
Germany and the Nordics. Policy makers in
LMEs therefore assume that unions will pro-
duce wage rigidity and holdup problems in
an economy which requires flexible, switch-
able assets so firms can exploit rapidly
changing market opportunities. The move to
place monetary policy in the hands of inde-
pendent central banks has also destroyed a
large part of the rationale for neocorpo-
ratism, as control of inflation no longer
requires reaching deals on wage restraint
with trade unions. Governments of both
right and left will therefore tend to side with
employers to push for deregulated labour
markets.9
If this sounds deterministic it is worth
remembering that Labour Prime Minister,
Tony Blair, despite his 179 seat first term
majority won in 1997, made few attempts to
revive social partnership. This was despite
determined lobbying by the TUC, which
published a stream of policy documents at
the end of the 1990s extolling the productiv-
ity benefits for employers of engaging with
unions. Trade unions under Blair did get a
national minimum wage (to be bargained
through a genuinely new tripartite structure,
the Low Pay Commission, created for the
purpose) as well as, for the first time, a
statutory route to union recognition and
accession to the European Social Chapter.
But these were arguably limited pickings
from a long-awaited Labour government
with a vast electoral mandate.
What about Lehmbruch’s definition of
neocorporatism as policy concertation? Bac-
caro suggests that this form of neocorpo-
ratism is compatible with a much wider
range of institutional structures.10 Economic
crises can be a catalyst for the emergence of
social partnership in countries lacking the
labour market structures and systems of
interest representation usually required to
sustain it. This could potentially hold lessons
for the UK.
Ireland, for example, is normally bracketed
with the UK as a LME as its mostly service
sector economy lacks strong, coordinated
trade unions, or much previous tradition of
successful social concertation. Yet, Ireland’s
economic crisis of the 1980s produced, not a
Thatcherite assault on collectivism, but a
‘Programme for National Recovery’ to over-
see sweeping economic reform, including
pay restraint. Social partnership emerged
again following the financial crisis as Ireland
implemented unpopular welfare and public
spending cuts. Ironically, Ireland’s status as
the poster-child of successful EU-imposed
austerity owes much to the efforts of trade
unions which were bitterly critical of it.
Although opposed to the austerity pro-
gramme of the EU, ECB and IMF ‘troika’,
Irish unions chose to eschew, for example,
the strategy of protest and class conflict seen
in Greece, as they judged from their earlier
experience with social partnership that they
had more to gain by shaping the process of
adjustment as an insider.11
Italy is another example. Italian unions are
stronger than Irish or UK unions but equally
fragmented at the peak level which is, if any-
thing, even more of a recipe for instability.
Here, the crisis consisted of a combination of
an endemically uncompetitive economy, cou-
pled with a need for budgetary restraint and
low inflation during the 1990s in order to
prepare the country for entry into the Euro-
pean single currency. A series of social pacts
were negotiated whereby job creation was
exchanged for pension reform and the aban-
donment of rigid structures for pay-setting.
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Italy duly qualified for the single currency,
although this has proven to be a rather
mixed blessing and, revealingly, the pacts
have not endured.
The Irish and Italian cases demonstrate
what ‘weak’ and/or overburdened states may
have to gain by involving social partners in
times of crisis when they can ill-afford social
or industrial relations distractions. Generally,
UK governments since the late 1970s have
assumed they can implement their chosen
policies without the close involvement of
business or unions and have therefore shown
little interest in social partnership. But with
Covid, the government, and Treasury espe-
cially, have been astute enough to see the
value of external input into policy design, as
well as presumably the value of some extra
political cover if these policies fail.
Reversing the long, slow decline
of organised labour?
To what extent are UK trade unions able
to take advantage of new opportunities for
social partnership represented by the crisis?
The signs are not particularly encouraging.
Unions face three main problems: long-term
decline in membership; their de-institutional-
isation in the labour market; and the chang-
ing nature of work.
As argued above, unions in LMEs such as
the UK enjoy little of the institutional protec-
tion available to organised labour in CMEs,
which means they have to rely on their
industrial muscle instead to induce employ-
ers to bargain with them and governments
to take notice of their interests. But union
membership and bargaining coverage have
declined precipitously since the 1970s. Mem-
bership of UK trade unions reached a high-
water mark of 13.3 million in 1979 at the
peak of neocorporatism—around 54 per cent
of the workforce. The influence of industry-
level bargaining and the wages councils at
this time meant that around 85 per cent of
the workforce was actually covered by col-
lective pay-setting mechanisms.12
Since then, and in trends mirrored across
Europe albeit less severely, union density
has fallen to 23 per cent and collective bar-
gaining coverage dropped to about 26 per
cent in 2016. Problems in recruitment also
mean the average age of union members is
rising. In 2015, just 9 per cent of 16–24 year-
olds and 19.8 per cent of 25–34 year-olds
were union members—a sharp fall from pre-
vious years.13 Although the decline in mem-
bership has been reversed over the last few
years, most of the gains have been in the
public sector.
The second problem is to do with power
in the workplace and the institutional setting
for trade unions. While large groups of pub-
lic sector workers still have their pay set col-
lectively, private employers have a legal
obligation to negotiate only where a trade
union has obtained recognition via a statu-
tory procedure. In other words, bargaining is
not an enforceable right as it is in many EU
countries. As trade unions have lost power,
the scope of bargaining has narrowed, and
the climate has shifted towards a style of
‘business unionism’ where involvement of
trade unions is judged on whether they con-
tribute to improving the productivity of the
firm.14
Multi-employer bargaining, which remains
the norm in many CMEs and in the UK
prior to the 1980s, has largely disappeared
from the private sector, although it remains
in the public sector. Making social partner-
ship work requires employers to participate.
Yet only 13 per cent of employers’ associa-
tions take part in collective bargaining.15
In a recent survey of the fortunes of UK
unions over the last few decades, Jeremy
Waddington identifies four structural ele-
ments in trade union decline.16 First is long-
term change in the composition of the UK
labour market from manufacturing, which
has tended to be highly unionised, to ser-
vices, which is not. Second is a shift in the
ownership of enterprises from public to pri-
vate, often from abroad. Third is an intensifi-
cation of competition in some sectors, which
may have caused managers to view organ-
ised labour as a drag on their ability to
respond, and fourth is the legal structure
within which collective bargaining takes
place.
Only the latter of these, the legal environ-
ment, is something that could be directly
improved by a friendly future Labour gov-
ernment, although many on the left con-
tinue to argue for structural economic and
industrial relations change to embrace, for
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example, continental style ‘stakeholder’ capi-
talism. Yet, the trend in employment law has
all along been deregulation and weakening
of the law, Waddington argues. As already
detailed, the Conservative government of
1979–1997 enacted five anti-union Acts of
Parliament. The principle piece of employ-
ment relations legislation introduced by the
last Labour government of 1997–2010—the
1999 Employment Relations Act—provided a
statutory route to legal recognition, but it
had a marginal impact on slowing the rate
of fall of union density. Moreover, the Con-
servatives Employment Act of 2016 contin-
ued the assault by further restricting unions’
ability to call strikes. Notwithstanding the
recent slight rise in membership, weaker
unions make less attractive bargaining part-
ners for employers and the government.
Changing work patterns
A final question mark over prospects for
social partnership is the changing nature of
work. One reasons for unions’ continued
recruitment difficulties outside the public
sector is problems they encounter in repre-
senting workers in the ‘new’ or ‘gig’ econ-
omy of short-term contracts, particularly
with technology and service companies.
Despite much hype, only a relatively small
proportion of workers actually work this
way at present. However, this number is set
to grow, entailing further possible erosion of
workers’ rights and shrunken opportunities
for workplace representation in the rest of
the labour market.
The so-called ‘new economy’ undermines
traditional employer–employee relationships
in various ways. There are several facets of
this that make it harder for workers to
organise. In the ‘sharing economy’ (a good
example being the taxi firm Uber) workers
compete with each other directly in a paral-
lel labour market rather than via an
employer to provide a service. On the other
hand, in the ‘platform economy’ (for exam-
ple, the online task provider, Mechanical
Turk) work is brokered to freelancers in an
online marketplace for talent which is reor-
ganising activities in traditional industries. In
both types of labour market the absence of
an obvious bargaining partner for unions in
the form of a single employer, as well as the
need for workers to compete with each other
for contracts, makes traditional notions of
social partnership somewhat redundant.
Of course, the new technologies also pro-
vide unions with new organising tools, for
example Facebook groups for activists and
YouTube guides for organisers. New, ‘grass
roots’ unions are also springing up, for
example, the Independent Workers of Great
Britain set up to try to represent gig econ-
omy workers. Existing unions are also inno-
vating, and new ways of organising are also
emerging. For example, in 2014, the Bakers,
Food and Allied Workers Union (BFAWU)
launched a campaign targeting fast food
giants. The concern was not just low pay,
but also the abundant use of zero-hour con-
tracts. As the average age of existing union
members was higher than the fast food
workers they were trying to organise, the
union adjusted its organising strategies to
appeal to younger workers and used more
flexible branch structures.
Overall, though, the new economy throws
a large spanner in the works for traditional
union organising and, with it, prospects for
a new phase of social partnership.
Conclusion
Covid has clearly led to a thaw in the
UK’s often conflictual industrial relations cli-
mate, as business, trade unions, and the gov-
ernment pull together to manage the crisis
and prepare for the painful transitions that
lie ahead. The scale of the economic response
being undertaken naturally invites compar-
ison with the previous era of macroeconomic
interventionism of the late 1960s and early
1970s, which also had as its cornerstone the
close involvement of business and unions. If
so, however, then the omens are not encour-
aging, as the UK’s neocorporatist episode
was brief and ended badly. Few people,
therefore, expect a return to this level of pol-
icy and labour market concertation, no mat-
ter how bad the economic situation gets.
A shift to a more cooperative industrial
relations climate might, however, still be pos-
sible and is something most trade unions and
many in government and business would also
like to see. Mark Carney, the former Governor
of the Bank of England, has warned that a
return to the pre-Covid world of shareholder
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value maximisation alongside labour market
precarity is not viable. There is pressure
within business for firms to replace profit
maximisation with broader purposes that
include building more cooperative labour
relations into their business models. However,
it is worth noting that this will still be entirely
at the behest of company managers, and at no
point does the enactment of a purpose agenda
respecting workers’ rights appear to require
the involvement of trade unions.
In general, there are few signs as yet that
any re-regulation of labour markets is on this
government’s agenda as a solution to the
unemployment crisis. Indeed, the flexibility
of the UK labour market is seen by many as
responsible for the rapid recovery in employ-
ment following the earlier financial crisis (al-
beit at the cost of a slump in labour
productivity growth).
Moves to institutionalise social partnership
in the labour market more widely, beyond the
ad hoc arrangements we have seen so far, will
probably therefore require unions to push the
case forcefully for this with government and
the more enlightened employers, as well as
deft leadership from the TUC. Moreover,
without strong, confident trade unions to act
as a counterweight, any form of social part-
nership that emerges from Covid will lack
secure foundations, prioritise the needs of
employers and is unlikely to endure.
Steve Coulter is a Visiting Fellow, European
Institute, London School of Economics
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